Modern security communication protocols typically protect data with peer-to-peer cryptographic message protection, and exhibit future secrecy property. Designing a protocol with peer-to-peer cryptographic message protection ensures that there is no security gap in the middle that could become an attractive attack entry point. Future secrecy is also a desirable property for a security protocol that ensures that exchanged messages cannot be compromised even if peer long-term keys are compromised in the future.
However, attempting to add message auditing capabilities into such a system poses a challenge when such peer-to-peer cryptographic message protection is desired, in addition to future secrecy. Specifically, intercepted messages cannot be logged in their original, encrypted form because they cannot be decrypted in the future in accordance with future secrecy. At the same time, decrypting the messages somewhere in the middle also does not provide a viable solution because messages are to be protected peer-to-peer, under peer-to-peer cryptographic message protection.
There is thus a need for addressing these and/or other issues associated with the prior art.